Misconduct Hearing Outcome - PC 537 Amadae Dowd
*This Outcome was not published at the time of the hearing due to an ongoing criminal investigation, which has now concluded.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE POLICE (CONDUCT) REGULATIONS 2020
BETWEEN:
THE CHIEF CONSTABLE OF CAMBRIDGESHIRE POLICE Appropriate Authority
-and
PC 537 AMADAE DOWD Officer Concerned
NOTIFICATION OF OUTCOME OF MISCONDUCT HEARING
PC Dowd, on 21-23 April 2026, you were asked to appear at a misconduct hearing, which was conducted by:
Chair: Julia Debenham
Independent Panel Member: Julie Lafferty
Independent Panel Member: Susannah Dengate
LQA: Harry Ireland
ALLEGATIONS:
- PC Amadae Dowd ('the Officer') joined the Cambridgeshire Police on 07/11/2016.
- The Management of Police Information Code of Practice ('MOPI') definition of 'policing purpose' is:
- Protecting life and property
- Preserving order
- Preventing the commission of offences
- Bringing offenders to justice
- Any duty or responsibility of the police arising from common or statute law
All police officers have a duty to ensure that they access information for which they have a legitimate policing purpose.
- The Officer had received training in relation to data protection and confidentiality in:
a. 2023. There are no dates provided which predate this. They should be completed annually by all BCH staff. The main data protection and confidentiality packages are the mandatory Managing Information packages.
- Cambridgeshire Officers had been reminded of the importance of data protection and confidentiality in:
a. PSD inputs
b. Training
5. In addition, every time a Cambridgeshire police officer signs into a police system they are presented with a declaration that reads as follows,
UNAUTHORISED USE OF THIS SYSTEM IS PROHIBITED AND MAY CONSTITUTE A CRIMINAL
OFFENCE UNDER THE COMPUTER MISUSE ACT 1990.
As a public authority, we are regulated in the use of our information systems by legislation.
- Your use of this computer and any systems are subject to monitoring and recording.
- Access to any police information must be for a legitimate work or lawful policing purpose. You may be asked to justify your purpose.
- Your entries must be accurate and written in a manner which would withstand scrutiny by a public agency or audit.
- The Freedom of Information Act and/or the Data Protection Act will apply to any information entered onto our systems which may later be disclosed.
- Accessing or disclosing police information for purposes other than in connection with your work is a disciplinary offence and may also be a criminal offence.
- By logging onto the network, you confirm understanding of the above declaration.
- Although reasonable personal internet and e-mail usage is permitted, there can be no expectation of privacy when using police owned systems.
Unless the Officer accepts the conditions set out and acknowledges their individual culpability for use of the systems the Officer cannot access the police systems.
6. The Officer wrongly disclosed confidential information during her role as a police officer:
a. On 10/02/2021, the Officer was assigned to ensure the safety of a 13-year-old child who had been the victim of very serious abuse and neglect and was extremely vulnerable. The child was in hospital and the Officer was sent to sit with them. The Officer was aware of the extent of the abuse, including that the child had been locked in an address for months with no food, had been beaten up and injured. The child’s face was badly burnt.
i. The Officer sent an image of the child via WhatsApp to a colleague. The image was a cropped image of an evidential photograph.
ii. The Officer sent a second image showing an adult female whose face had been badly burned in an acid attack. The image was a cropped image of an evidential photograph.
The Officer knew it was wrong to do so and told the recipient ‘Obvs delete.’ The Officer had no control over whether the recipient would do so.
b. On 14/04/2021, the Officer was at hospital with another child (aged 17). It was believed that the child had packed drugs in their anus. The child was vulnerable. The Officer was monitoring the child. The Officer was asked, ‘Have you killed him?’ At 20:40 the Officer sent a picture of the child sat on the edge of a bed and doubled up in a WhatsApp group with a message saying, ‘Maybe?!’
- On 09/03/2021, the Officer sent a video of Ex-Police Sergeant Street dropping a black box safe from a balcony to him. As ex-sergeant Street dropped the safe, he said, ‘Right. Here’s to a gun.’
PARTICULARS OF MISCONDUCT
Police Constable Amadae Dowd it is alleged that you have breached the Standards of Professional
Behaviour, and in particular the standards relating to:
(1) Honesty and Integrity (Integrity only)
In that you acted without integrity, in that you disclosed confidential information when there was no policing purpose so to do as set out at paragraph 6.
(2) Confidentiality
Your behaviour as set out above has breached this Standard.
In that you disclosed confidential information when there was no policing purpose so to do as set out at paragraph 6.
(3) Discreditable Conduct
In that your behaviour as set out at paragraphs 6 and 7 above has discredited the police service and/or undermined public confidence in it.
It is alleged that these matters individually and/or collectively amount to gross misconduct, namely a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that, if proved, is so serious that your dismissal would be justified.
EVIDENCE
An application made by the AA was to restrict any reporting of the hearing until after the conclusion of the criminal trial against PS Street. Evidence relating to PS Street was contained within the bundle before the Panel and would necessarily be referred to by the officer in her defence. The AA did not seek to rely on his testimony.
The application was based upon the claim that any reporting of the Misconduct hearing could prejudice the trial against PS Street in particular because evidence contained in the present bundle would be relevant and considered in the criminal trial and may adversely affect the fairness of those proceedings.
The Panel was mindful of Regulation 39 of the 2020 Regulations.
Regulation 39 (3)(c) states:
(3) Having considered any representations received under regulations 33(8)(f), 36(3) and 36(5), the person conducting or chairing the misconduct proceedings may—
(c)in the case of a chair appointed under regulation 28(4), give such directions as they think appropriate prohibiting the publication of any matter relating to the proceedings.
Regulation 39 (7)(a) states:
(7) This paragraph applies to information in so far as the person conducting or chairing the misconduct proceedings considers that preventing disclosure of it to an attendee is—
(a)necessary for the purpose of preventing the premature or inappropriate disclosure of information that is relevant to, or may be used in, any criminal proceedings;
Therefore, taking all submissions into account, including the direction within the Home Office Guidance as to the centrality of transparency within the Misconduct regime, it was determined that the proper administration of justice must, in this case, take precedence over the importance of transparency and the ability of the media to report such proceedings. Accordingly, an order was made that:
- That there be no publication of any matters from the gross misconduct hearing.
- That this restriction remains in place until the conclusion of the impending criminal trial relating to PS Street and Op Hightower.
The officer clarified her position by admitting that the allegations contained in the Regulation 30 Notice at 6(a) and (b) were admitted on the basis that she had breached the Standard in relation to confidentiality only to the level of Misconduct only, and that the allegation at 7 was denied.
The AA added a document to the bundle, namely a screen shot of the confidentiality warning once an officer logs onto the police database. They also sought an amendment to the date of the allegation at 6(b) to 2020. Neither were opposed and the applications were granted.
The case for the AA relied upon the evidence submitted in the prepared bundle and Counsel’s opening. No live evidence was deemed necessary in the interests of justice. The officer gave evidence in her defence.
She told the Panel that she had never seen any policy relating to the use of social media and could not recall any input in her training about such but acknowledged that there would have been some input on this topic. She accepted that she sees the warning regarding data protection when logging onto the police systems.
She told the Panel how her team were encouraged by her sergeant to utilise WhatsApp as a medium of communication for her team members for ‘work matters’ and this was apparently an accepted practice within the Force at the time of the events the Panel were dealing with.
In respect of allegation 6(a) she expanded upon her explanation previously given that her conversation and provision of the photographs complained of to her sergeant was a form of welfare, and that it was a means of ‘offloading’ and ‘decompressing.’ She did this she said because she found the details of the offences being investigated, including the nature of the injuries suffered by the victims, so disturbing and ‘outside her experience.’ She had not only read the briefing note, a copy of which was contained in the bundle, but also the evidence relating to the case at hand which included the photographs complained of. She did this, she said, to ensure that she had all relevant details should the young girl engage her in conversation about the case.
She denied that her language was flippant or disrespectful, but did engage in the messaging knowing of the party’s vulnerability.
The two photographs she sent to her sergeant via WhatsApp were obtained from the file relating to the two victims. The officer had used her personal ‘phone to take the pictures from the file and then sent them. The officer accepted that whilst she had observation duties in relation to the 13-year-old girl, she had no contact or involvement with her mother. She accepted that she had told her sergeant to ‘obviously delete’ the photos but did so because he would not need to retain them once seen. It was her way she said of more accurately describing the injuries than using words. She accepted that once sent, she would have no control over their subsequent use.
The officer never considered the impact of her actions upon the victims nor the potential impact on any future criminal proceedings despite the clear warning within the briefing note regarding the issue of the lack of trust of the police by the two victims. She failed also to consider whether her actions were wrong; she at the time did not consider this to be the case but now realises that they were.
The Panel accepted that there may have been a degree of welfare in her contact with her sergeant given the nature of what the officer was dealing with whilst at the hospital. She had no lawful reason to access the file of evidence relating to the victims given the clear instruction provided within the briefing note. It should also have been obvious to the officer that in the sharing of any information that there was a clear risk to the welfare of the victims and the future of any criminal proceedings. The Panel found that the officer accessed the file in order to brief herself in relation to the investigation but found that this was unnecessary and beyond her remit. Her knowledge of the improper nature of her actions is apparent from her message following the sending of the photographs by telling her sergeant ‘obvs delete’; the Panel did not accept her explanation regarding this message. Her background, and declared interest in matters of Safeguarding must have made her alert to the risk that she was taking as well as the improper nature of her actions. Thus, the more sensible interpretation of her telling her sergeant to delete the photographs was because she knew and appreciated that she should not have sent them to him, having no lawful purpose for doing so.
The Panel thus found the allegation proven.
The allegation listed at 6 (b) relating to 17-year-old youth shared similarities with the first allegation, namely the use of WhatsApp to not only discuss work issues but in some cases, (albeit not involving the officer to any significant degree), provide derogatory and abusive views of the detainee.
Given the officer’s’ description of the youth’s actions and his involvement in an OCG supplying controlled drugs there was undoubtedly a very negative view of this youth by all the officers concerned. It is also apparent that none considered the vulnerability of the youth who was only 17 years of age. The officer told the Panel the youth was very difficult to deal with, being volatile and aggressive, threatening to rape her and her children. Again, she claimed that the messaging and sharing of the photograph was a form of ‘decompression’ and the officer’s involved used dark humour as a ‘pressure valve.’
She accepted at the hearing that she had acted unprofessionally and that she and others were responding to how the youth had treated them. The Panel found that there was an element of degradation and mocking by the officer towards the youth, and negated her explanation (which the Panel found lacked credibility) that the sharing of the photograph and her comments were intended to be a joke on the officers involved, and not on him. The question ‘have you killed him yet?’ and her response ‘maybe’ shows clearly her attitude towards him.
The Panel found that the officer, and others involved in the conversation, showed a complete lack of respect towards the youth. He undoubtedly was unpleasant and difficult to deal with and was suspected of drug related offences, but such challenging situations are, unfortunately, hardly unusual for police officers and this is where their professionalism is very important. Her Counsel rightly described the officer’s actions as ‘ill judged and thoughtless,’ failing to appreciate the seriousness of her actions. The Panel found that, given her experience, such a failure was inexcusable.
The Panel found that the allegation was proven.
The final allegation related to the officer recording on her personal phone the attempt by her sergeant to open a safe by throwing it from a balcony at Cambourne police station, other methods having failed.
The Panel failed to understand exactly what allegation the AA was making against her and how it is claimed that she breached any Standard. The actions of the sergeant may be criticised but the officer told the Panel that she was recording the actions for evidential purposes. A counsel of perfection may claim that her body worn video should have been used but such is a very minor criticism.
This allegation was dismissed.
The Panel thus found proven the allegations as described above and determined that they breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour relating to:
Honesty and Integrity (Integrity only)
Confidentiality
Discreditable Conduct
Given that the officer’s actions were deliberate and intentional and involved vulnerable victims her culpability was found to be high as was the level of harm caused.
Therefore, the Panel found that such breaches amount to Gross Misconduct.
SANCTION
The Panel began by reminding itself of the threefold purpose of the Misconduct regime, namely:
Firstly, to protect the public confidence in and the reputation of policing.
Secondly, to maintain the high professional standards by demonstrating to other officers that misconduct will not be tolerated.
Thirdly, to protect the public and/or officers and staff by preventing the officers from committing similar misconduct again.
The Panel also followed the guidance from the court in Fuglers LLP v Solicitors Regulation Authority [2014] EWHC 179 (Admin) and the Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings.
In determining the appropriate sanction, we took into account the following matters:
CULPABILITY
High.
Deliberate, intentional involving clearly vulnerable victims (Adult 1 and Child 1) and a child (Child A). Information was disclosed by sending photographs. There was a potential compromise to the investigation.
The harm occasioned was unintentional but the officer could reasonably have foreseen the risk of harm
On both occasions, Pc Dowd was in a trusted position.
Regarding data protection, a breach of confidentiality is agreed.
The breach included onward disclosure, potential compromise to a police investigation and breach of personal privacy.
HARM
High
The panel is concerned that there has been real harm caused as Adult 1 have been informed of the sending of the photographs.
There is potential serious harm caused to wider public confidence. Officers disclosing sensitive photographs of members of the public, even within closed Whatsapp groups, would and has caused significant concerns to the public. The public should trust that such data is protected and secure.
The images were shared only with Pc Dowd's supervisor and then outwith her control
The image was taken and shared on a group Whatsapp group, albeit the detainee was not identifiable.
AGGRAVATING FACTORS
(The following should be read in conjunction with the comments and observations recorded above. The Panel was cognisant of the need to avoid ‘double counting.’)
Pc Dowd was in a position of trust with vulnerable people
There are multiple victims
The conduct was on two occasions, but was not sustained or regular
There are multiple breaches of the standards on two occasions but they relate to the same facts
The photograph of Child A was shared in support of wider degrading conversation of Child A.
MITIGATING FACTORS
The officer has made partial admissions at the start of the proceedings.
The officer has shown evidence on insight and remorse.
Having assessed that the actions of the officer were serious and amounted to gross misconduct, the panel accepts that they were of limited duration. On the evidence presented, the direct impact of her actions was limited.
The Panel noted the guidance from the College of Policing regarding personal mitigation at Section 6 and in particular the following:
As Lord Justice Maurice Kay confirmed in the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Salter:
‘As to personal mitigation, just as an unexpectedly errant solicitor can usually refer to an unblemished past and the esteem of his colleagues, so will a police officer often be able so to do. However, because of the importance of public confidence, the potential of such mitigation is necessarily limited.’
However, due to the nature and purpose of disciplinary proceedings, the weight of personal mitigation will necessarily be limited, particularly where serious misconduct has been proven
Personal Mitigation
The panel has received numerous character statements, evidence of commendations and good work in relation to Pc Dowd. Some of these have included her work since the service of the Regulation 17 notice. The panel accepted submissions on behalf of the officer that she has continued to access police data systems during the course of her work without any concerns.
The character evidence provided points to an officer who is well respected for her hard work. There is particular note for her work with vulnerable victims and members of the public. It is noted that many of the statements in support of her have been provided by supervisory officers.
As directed by the Guidance on Outcomes on Police Misconduct Proceedings, the Panel in determining the appropriate sanction has considered in the first instance the least serious outcome of Final Written Warning.
Under Regulation 43 (1) (e) of the Conduct regulations, the person conducting the proceedings must include in the report submitted to the appropriate authority at the conclusions of proceedings
“where it was found that the conduct of the officer concerned amounted to gross misconduct but the disciplinary action imposed was not dismissal without notice, the reasons for that decision.”
The panel was reminded of the purpose of the police misconduct regime in
- Maintaining confidence in, and the reputation of, the police service
- To uphold high standards in policing and to deter misconduct
- To protect the public
The panel had made a finding of Gross Misconduct. The allegations were serious and that panel’s finding reflects this.
A finding of Gross Misconduct does not necessarily lead to dismissal. The panel is directed by the Guidance on Outcomes (para 2.8) to “consider less serious severe outcomes before more severe outcomes. Always choose the least severe outcome that adequately deals with the issues identified , while protecting the public interest.”
The panel assessed that public confidence could be maintained by the imposition of a Final Written Warning. This is a serious sanction and demonstrates the seriousness of the misconduct.
The panel assessed that the provision of a Final Written Warning in these circumstances would serve to uphold standards and to deter others.
The panel assessed that the officer understood that her conduct was wrong. The panel is confident that there is no ongoing risk to the public of repeated misconduct. Dismissal is not necessary in this case in order to protect the public.
In concluding that a Final Written Warning would, in these circumstances, be the appropriate sanction, the panel was mindful of the time that these proceedings have taken to come before a panel. It is five years since the misconduct occurred. In these circumstances, the panel has determined that the appropriate period for the Final Written Warning to remain in force is three years.
Final Outcome – Pc DOWD receives a Final Written Warning for a period of Three Years.
Julia Debenham
Chair
24rd April 2026