Misconduct Hearing Outcome - Former Officer Joseph Passby

In the matter of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020 as amended by Police (Conduct) (Ammendment) Regulations 2024

Cambridgeshire Constabulary

Former Officer Joseph Passby: Reference CM/56/26

Written Determination of finding and outcome

Dated: 25th August 2026

Introduction

The purpose of the misconduct regime is:

1. To maintain public confidence and the reputation of the police service
2. To uphold high standards in policing and deter misconduct
3. To protect the public

I have delegated authority for the chairing of misconduct hearings from the Chief Constables of Bedfordshire, Cambridgeshire, and Hertfordshire.

An accelerated misconduct hearing was held in relation to former Cambridgeshire officer Joseph Passby, case reference CM/56/26 on 25th August 2026, at Lysander House, Bedfordshire.

The hearing was a public hearing and the rationale for that position was recorded and provided to the Professional Standards Department.

The hearing was recorded and this is the written determination of finding and outcome from the hearing.

Role of the chair

Stage 1

(a) First, determining the facts, based upon what is admitted by the former officer, or proven on the balance of probabilities;
(b) Second, determining whether on the basis of those facts the former officer breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour alleged;
(c) Third, deciding whether any such breaches, amount to gross misconduct;

Stage 2

(d) Fourth, deciding what the outcome should be.

Attendance

The Appropriate Authority was represented at the hearing by the officer in the case.

The former officer was not in attendance and was not represented.

The Appropriate Authority outlined the schedule of contact made with the former officer, to ensure he was aware of the date and time of the hearing, and relevant papers and information required under the regulations had been brought to his attention.

I remind myself of the legal case of R v Jones & Hayward [2002] UKHL 5 and GMC v Adeogba and Visvardis [2016] EWCA Civ 162.

The case of Adeogba being that the Chair’s primary objective is the protection of the public and the public interest, and that the “Fair, economical, expeditious and efficient disposal of allegations made against medical practitioners is of very real importance” and that “where there is good reason not to proceed, the case should be adjourned; where there is not, however, it is only right that it should proceed”.

“There is a burden on all professionals subject to a regulatory regime, to engage with the regulator, both in relation to the investigation and ultimate resolution of allegations made against them. That is part of the responsibility to which they sign up when being admitted to the profession.”

In deciding whether to proceed in the absence of the former officer, I balanced the legitimate public interest and my responsibility for the expeditious disposal of the case, against the former officer’s right to be present at the hearing.

Paragraph 106 of Home Office Guidance 2020 confirms:

“The hearing may be conducted and concluded in the absence of the officer whether or not they are represented”.

I was satisfied that all reasonable efforts had been made to notify the former officer of the hearing details, and the evidence and allegations against him.

I was satisfied on the evidence presented on behalf of the Appropriate Authority, that the former officer had of his own volition, elected to neither attend, nor be represented.

My decision was that the hearing would proceed in the former officer’s absence.

Accelerated Misconduct Hearings (Special Conditions)

It was determined by the Appropriate Authority that:

(i) There is sufficient evidence, in the form of written statements or other documents, to establish on the balance of probabilities that the conduct of the former officer concerned constitutes gross misconduct, and

(i) It is in the public interest for the former officer to be included in the police barred list without delay - outlined in Regulation 49 of the Conduct Regulations and paragraph 20A(2)(b) of Schedule 3 to the 2002 Act as modified.

These are known as special conditions and are why the hearing has been convoked.

The allegations

The allegations were set out in the Regulation 51 notice of referral to an Accelerated Misconduct Hearing and accompanying documentation, within an evidential bundle, which I confirmed that I have seen and read.

At approximately 09.00hrs on 15th June 2026 the former officer was on duty working from Parkside Police Station, Cambridgeshire.

The former officer drove an unmarked police vehicle and was involved in a road traffic collision with a taxi having consumed alcohol prior to attending work.

Colleagues attended the scene of the road traffic collision to complete the necessary documentation and to conduct a roadside breath test.

The former officer subsequently provided a roadside breath sample of 110ug of alcohol per 100 millilitres of breath, with officers initially believing that the reading may have been affected by a cough sweet and the use of a vape.

A further breath test was therefore conducted at the police station where the former officer provided a further breath sample of 113ug of alcohol per 100 millilitres of breath.

The former officer was arrested on suspicion of driving whilst over the prescribed alcohol limit and taken to Kempston Custody in Bedfordshire where he provided two evidential breath specimens reading 88 and 81 microgrammes of alcohol on 100 millilitres of breath.

On 15th June 2026 the former officer was charged with driving a motor vehicle whilst over the prescribed alcohol limit.

On 20th July 2026 the former officer appeared at Luton Magistrates Court and entered a guilty plea and was sentenced to a 12-month driving disqualification and ordered to pay the application costs.

The Appropriate Authority brings the allegations, and it is for the Appropriate Authority to prove them.

The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities, that is to say whether they are more likely than not to be true. The balance of probabilities is a single unvarying standard. (Home Office guidance paragraph 9.10).

It is alleged that the former officer breached the following Standards of Professional Behaviour as below, and set out in Schedule 2 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020:

• Discreditable Conduct
• Fitness for Duty

The Appropriate Authority set out that these matters above amount to gross misconduct and are so serious as to justify dismissal.

Evidence

The evidence used to prove the facts in dispute is in the documents served with the Regulation 51 notice, to which the former officer did not provide a response.

The Appropriate Authority presented the case with an ‘opening note’ outlining the evidence and this was read into the record.

I make it clear that I carefully considered all of the material provided by the Appropriate Authority.

The former officer did not attend so was not able to submit that their conduct did or did not amount to gross misconduct.

The evidence included the former officer’s admissions regarding drinking alcohol prior to his tour of duty, being intoxicated through alcohol whilst on duty, and the offence of drink driving.

The evidence contained accounts from colleagues, and confirmation that the breath samples provided exceeded the legal limit.

The former officer provided evidential samples of 88 and 81 microgrammes of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath, significantly in excess of the prescribed legal limit of 35 micrograms. He was arrested, charged with drink driving pleaded guilty at court.

Determination of facts (A)

I give due regard to Home Office guidance, Police (Conduct) Regulations, 2020, Home Office Guidance, and the college of policing “Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings” when considering all of the evidence presented.

I find all the allegations proven, on the balance of probabilities.

Breaches of standards of professional behaviour (B)

I find the following Standards of Professional Behaviour to be engaged, as set out in Schedule 2 of the Police (Conduct) Regulations 2020:

• Discreditable Conduct – The former officer drove a vehicle on a road, having consumed alcohol, and provided positive evidential specimens of 88 and 81 micrograms of alcohol in 100 milliliters of breath, the legal limit being 35. He was arrested and charged with drink driving and submitted a guilty plea.
• Fitness for Duty – Having attended the workplace whilst under the influence of alcohol as described, he then drove a police vehicle, on duty, risking the safety of the public and colleagues. Notwithstanding the drink driving offence, this standard of professional behaviour is engaged in its own right.

In finding these breaches, I consider the decision of Wyn Williams J, in Chief Constable of Wiltshire v Police Appeals Tribunal (Paul Woollard Interested Party) [2012] EWHC 3288 (Admin) that in order to prove a breach of the standard relating to discreditable conduct, it is not necessary to prove that actual discredit was brought to the police service; it is sufficient that the conduct had the potential to do so.

Seriousness assessment (C)

Having determined these breaches of the standards, I must consider whether such breaches constitute gross misconduct. Regulations 2(1) states:

“Gross misconduct means a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour that is so serious as to justify dismissal”.

I remind myself of the purpose of the police conduct regulations:

• Firstly, to protect public confidence in and the reputation of policing.

• Secondly, to maintain the high professional standards by demonstrating to other officers that misconduct will not be tolerated.

• Thirdly, to protect the public and / or officers and staff by preventing the officers from committing similar misconduct again.

In assessing seriousness and whether these breaches amount to gross misconduct, I used the College of Policing Guidance on outcomes in police misconduct proceedings. I take into consideration culpability, harm and factors that aggravated or mitigated the former officer’s conduct.

Culpability:

Culpability denotes the officer’s blameworthiness or responsibility for their actions. The more culpable or blameworthy the behaviour in question, the more serious the misconduct and the more severe the likely outcome. Conduct that is intentional, deliberate, targeted or planned will generally be more culpable than conduct that has
unintended consequences, although the consequences of an officer’s actions will be relevant to the harm caused.

Culpability will also be increased if the officer was holding a position of trust or responsibility at the relevant time. All police officers are in a position of trust, but an officer’s level of responsibility may be affected by specific circumstantial factors, such as rank, their particular role and their relationship with any persons affected by the misconduct.

I have carefully considered the circumstances of the former officer’s conduct and whether that conduct could be considered reasonable. The former officer’s conduct would not be considered reasonable in the eyes of fair-minded members of the public, who’s trust and confidence underpins policing by consent, and must be maintained.

• The former officer’s actions were intentional and deliberate.
• The former officer would have foreseen the risk of harm, both to the public and to the reputation of policing.
• Para 4.17 “It is unacceptable for police officers, who are responsible for enforcing the law, to break the law themselves”
• Para 4.18 “A relatively minor criminal offence may be of the utmost gravity in the professional context.”

Culpability in this case is HIGH

Harm

As stated in the Guidance on outcomes:

“Harm will likely undermine public confidence in policing. Harm does not need to be suffered by a defined individual or group to undermine public confidence”.

“Where an officer commits an act that would harm public confidence if the circumstances were known to the public, take this into account”.

“Always take misconduct seriously that undermines discipline and good order within the police service, even if it does not result in harm to individual victims”.

• The actions of the former officer undoubtedly undermine public trust and confidence.
• There is ongoing national concern regarding misconduct in policing.
• The risks attached to the former officer’s conduct include the likelihood of harm occurring and the gravity of harm that could have resulted.

Harm in this case is HIGH

Aggravating factors:

• The former officer was drink driving on duty and would have known that his conduct was improper.
• The former officer failed to report being unfit for duty and failed to seek advice from colleagues or supervisors.
• There are two breaches of standards of professional behaviour.
• The former officer held a position that brings expectations as a role model.

Mitigating factors:

I am not presented with any mitigation on behalf of the former officer, so from what is contained within the evidence:

• This appears to be a single episode.
• Once the offence came to light, the former officer made early admissions and initially engaged with the investigation.
• There was a degree of genuine insight and remorse.

Having conducted this seriousness assessment, I find the conduct alleged so serious as to justify dismissal and therefore record a finding of Gross Misconduct.

Outcome (D)

The Appropriate Authority submitted that in order to maintain public trust and confidence, and to deter misconduct, an outcome of dismissal without notice, had the former officer been serving, was the most appropriate outcome.

The former officer was not in attendance and I was not presented with any submissions on his behalf.

Having used college of policing guidance on outcomes in misconduct proceedings, to assess the conduct of the former officer as gross misconduct, with culpability and harm assessed as high, I adopt these considerations again and do not repeat them.

In doing so, I remind myself of the purpose of the misconduct regulations, and the fact that the purpose is not solely to punish the former officer.

• Protect public confidence in and the reputation of policing.
• Maintain high professional standards, by demonstrating that misconduct will not be tolerated.
• Protect the public and/or officers and staff by preventing officers from committing similar misconduct again.

I turn to personal mitigation and in the absence of any submission on behalf of the former officer, I have given consideration to his record of police service.

I do recognise and acknowledge his contribution to policing which is outlined in the record of police service.

I have kept in mind that I should choose the outcome which deals adequately with the issues identified and protects the public interest.

There is very limited mitigation, and in accordance with guidance, I must balance mitigation with the need to maintain public confidence and high standards in the policing profession, and I remind myself of the case of Salter:

“Just as an unexpectedly errant solicitor can usually refer to an unblemished past, so will a police officer often be able to do so. However, because of the importance of public confidence, the potential of such mitigation is necessarily limited”

I have considered the options available to me and what would be proportionate with regards to this specific case, giving consideration to very limited mitigation, the former officer’s record of police service and all the evidence I have seen and heard.

College of policing guidance is clear that I can only consider two outcomes: Disciplinary action or no disciplinary action.

3.31: Where the finding is gross misconduct and disciplinary action is imposed, this can only be that the former officer would have been dismissed if still serving.

No other sanctions can be enforced

Given the seriousness of the breaches of the standards of professional behaviour, the nature of the former officer’s conduct, and to satisfy the purpose of the regulations my decision is that disciplinary action will follow.

My decision is that had the former officer been serving, he would be dismissed without notice.

The former officer will be notified formally, within 5 working days of this decision, along with details of their right of appeal.

Vaughan Lukey
Assistant Chief Constable