The IOPC recommends that Cambridgeshire Constabulary should review its processes for the supervision of medium risk missing persons investigation to ensure that:
i. it is clear which individual has supervisory responsibility
ii. the person who should have supervisory responsibility at any one time is identifiable and auditable
This recommendation follows an IOPC investigation into the investigation of a missing person which found a lack of effective supervision on a medium risk missing person investigation, and no auditable record of who had responsibility for supervision. The Cambridgeshire Constabulary Missing Person Manual of Standards (MoS) was, and is, clear that supervision of medium risk missing person investigations are the responsibility of the Response Team duty sergeant, with reviews to be completed on each early shift. However, we found that across forty nine early shifts, only sixteen supervisor reviews were completed. Due to multiple response sergeants being on each early shift, and the lack of any reliable or centralised record of which of those sergeants was responsible for completing the review, there was no way of identifying the specific officer responsible for undertaking this role, particularly when supervisory reviews were not completed as they ought to have been in line with the MoS.
Accepted action:
Cambridgeshire Police have used the learning that has come from the investigation in question to inform an array of improvement measures around the supervision of future MFH investigations.
A full review of current processes was conducted. Through a series of engagements with front line staff and supervisors the Head of Crime and PVP department formulated a clear Manual of Standards to clarify best practice, reinforce expectations and to monitor adherence going forward.
Within this comprehensive MoS the issue of supervision is clearly specified. It has led to:
· Templated handover and supervisory reviews which are dip sampled for compliance
· Oversight at local and force Daily Management Meetings where ownership of each missing person investigation is discussed and scrutinised.
· Dip-sampling of cases through missing person audits.
Moreover, to ensure the delivery of the new principles and processes a further strategic element has been added to our wider vulnerability provision– Vulnerability Focus Desks (VFDs):
· VFD’s monitor daily to ensure supervisors are assigned and progress is made diligently against the tasks and supervisor action plans.
· VFD’s re-iterate messaging through a monthly blog and take opportunities at local DMM to reinforce best practice.
· They also engage staff and highlight performance via Vulnerability Performance Group governance meetings, ensuring engagement with frontline supervisors.
· Identify quickly any issues for escalation and areas for specialist support
· Provide invaluable resilience at times of heightened demand ensuring confidence and morale is maintained
· Provide supervisors with support as a corporate memory to ensure both operational learning is maintained and specific instances, individuals and locations can be linked preventatively.
Finally, the Vulnerability Performance Group is a renewed whole-force governance mechanism through which has a dedicated remit of scrutinising our performance, identifying any emerging trends or patterns and giving a voice to all officers as to systemic blockages or operational successes which can inform continual improvement.
2. Recommendation
The IOPC recommends that Cambridge Constabulary should develop and roll out additional training to Response Team officers in relation to missing person investigations, to include:
evidential opportunities in missing person investigations
how to complete actions to the required standard
the value of communications data in missing person investigations
how to complete requests for communications data on missing person investigation
This follows an IOPC investigation relating to a missing person investigation which was re-classified as high risk after seven weeks at medium risk and subsequently led to a murder investigation following a lack of proof of life after this time. The IOPC found evidence to indicate that some basic actions, were not initially carried out in accordance with relevant national guidance (Authorised Professional Practice), such as a thorough search of the missing person's home. The IOPC also found evidence to indicate key lines of enquiry relating to communications data were not effectively followed up by officers, including missed opportunities to "re-run" forward-facing communications data applications which were already authorised. Staff from the Covert Authorities Bureau highlighted to the IOPC inadequacies and delays in officers' applications for communications data. These issues may have contributed to delays in establishing the true nature of the disappearance. These issues occurred over a relatively long period of time and involved numerous officers, which may be indicative of a broader training issue.
Do you accept the recommendation?:
Yes
Accepted action:
The training of response and investigative officers has been addressed both directly through the creation and delivery of specific training packages but also through structural additions, namely the Vulnerability Focus Desks.
The latter are a pivotal development in that they are a team of 12 officers and staff who actively engage with officers during current MFH investigations in order to provide live-time advice, guidance and support. Not only are they able to ensure efficient, correct and professional progression of MFH investigations, directing enquiries and quality assuring actions, they are able to upskill officers around the completion of communications applications, accessing partnership support and ensuring engagement with our Missing Exploited and Trafficked Hub where personalised engagement can begin with young missing persons in particular to end a cycle of missing episodes and divert them away from criminal pathways.
This wholistic approach to enhancing officers’ performance is cemented through the more direct provision of inputs:
· CDPU’s have developed a dedicated missing person training package which includes a work through case study including investigative opportunities.
· “Stepping Up” training to Sgts and Insp’s – one of the key messages in this training is that supervision is key to missing persons investigations.
· Additional bespoke training packages are created as new learning and directives go online from the national perspective, again delivered through the Continuous Professional Development Units.
· Multi-agency training days are held in conjunction with Missing People which focus on push and pull factors with an emphasis on experiences of young people who go missing.
· VFD blogs which provide training tips for officers.
· CAB / SPOC involved in training around phone work and how they can help
3. Recommendation
The IOPC recommends that Cambridgeshire Constabulary takes steps to ensure it provides clear direction to officers on handling and recording allegations of crime which come to light during a missing person investigation. In particular, that appropriate guidance is provided regarding the handling of allegations of sexual abuse, domestic abuse or (so-called) Honour Based Abuse – and the potential relevance of such allegations to the investigation.
Our investigation found that, in the days following the missing person report, it was disclosed to Cambridgeshire Constabulary that the missing person made allegations of sexual abuse against her stepfather days before being reported. The stepfather was later convicted of murdering the missing person. These allegations were disclosed to police on multiple occasions during the missing person investigation, with multiple officers and staff receiving this information from different sources. However, no crime was recorded, and the allegations were not investigated until seven weeks after the initial missing person report.
The College of Policing Authorised Professional Practice (APP) stipulates that where sexual offences are disclosed during a missing person investigation “but were not the original reported incident, this information should be passed to the force intelligence capability and investigated”. During our investigation, we noted that APP also instructs officers investigating missing persons to consider that part of an abuser’s strategy may be to report the victim missing to portray false concern to cover up abuse or homicide. Although Cambridgeshire Constabulary's local guidance on missing persons (the Manual of Standards) refers to domestic and sexual abuse as a “push factor”, there is no guidance to officers on how such information should be handled, recorded or shared. In this case, concerns about the perpetrator may have been raised earlier if these allegations had been handled in line with the APP and investigated more thoroughly and at an earlier juncture, indicating a need to bring local procedure into line with national guidance.
Do you accept the recommendation?:
Yes
Accepted action:
This is again an area where we have taken the broadest possible strategic response.
Firstly, we have ensured the wider enhancement of our force wide investigative standards through a complete remodelling of our scrutiny, supervision and performance monitoring framework within the Crime Standards Delivery Group. This now includes a Key Offender Dashboard, a dedicated operation to assess and track outstanding offenders and a sharper focus on our crime recording and progression protocols.
Secondly, we have instituted additional guidance and templates for investigative supervision to ensure that all crimes are supervised and guidance given more regularly, more robustly and with an even greater focus on safeguarding.
Thirdly, we are currently devising two major workstreams – Project Eleos and Project Kaizen – that will absorb much of the national learning form the End to End Rape Review and the Police Response to VAWG Report. These two projects will set out an array of enhanced investigative and response procedures for Serious Sexual Offences and Domestic Abuse respectively. These will go live in the next 4-8 weeks.
These developments complement the other existing elements:
· MASH monitor all missing children to ensure 101’s are shared as part of the investigation.
· MET Hub, CAISU and RIT officers provide specialist PIP 2 advice on crimes and their skills can be accessed more easily through the VFDs quick time intervention. This includes specific identification of peer on peer abuse, HBV, County Lines activity, CCE and CSE as well as vulnerable adult and Domestic Abuse.
· The monitoring of crimes at an increased frequency by the VFDs ensures matters can be escalated, vulnerability identified and crimes, historical or otherwise, can be identified and linked. Where supervisory escalation is needed this too can be readily achieved.
· Sexual offences are part of the force NCRS / CDI audit cycle & discussed at CDI Tactical meeting where individual and team feedback is given
· All incidents where a missing person has come to harm during a missing episode are reviewed at Inspector-level to ensure fast-time learning and best practice are captured and shared. This forms a specific part of the now monthly Vulnerability Performance Group.